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Abstract 
Meagre discussion on the institutional property-rights structure essence has rudimentarily determined 
the POS governance and its quality. Thus, two objectives are highlighted; (i) to examine Sabah’s current 
practice (rights distribution) in urban-rural POS governance and (ii) explore the POS’ social dilemmas 
that tied in with such institution. Reviews of interdisciplinary analytic perspectives, content analysis on 
documents and semi-structured interviews were performed. The practice with diverse property-rights 
structure is indicatively perceived as “property-rights tragedies”, which ensue in sub-optimal POS and 
quality of life issues. Therefore, re-engineering of POS market via dynamic property-rights re-
assignment is postulated as the panacea for improved wellbeing. 
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1.0 Introduction  
Recurring issues concerning the governance regarding usage and conservation of 
idiosyncratic public open space (POS) have critically been debated on livability (quality of 
life),  and sustainability of societies (Mansor, Said, & Mohammad, 2010; Nasution & Zahrah, 
2012) (Figure 1). Thus, as for the present study area which too confronts the aforesaid 
ecological issues that convincingly related to inefficient property institution which has been 
sparsely discoursed (Colding et al., 2013), several doubts are posed like what and how is 
Sabah’s practice with regard to property rights structure view in POS governance and the 
conundrums associated with it? Due to the tension, property-rights-based approach is 
commonsensibly employed as the crux in shedding new light (Webster, 2005) of which; we 
endeavour to (i) examine Sabah’s current practice in urban-rural POS governance and, (ii) 
explore the POS’ social dilemmas and negative externalities of Sabah’s status quo pertaining 
to  practice.   
 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship between the POS and societies’ quality of life and sustainability 
Source: Adapted from Chiesura (2004) 
 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theory and Review of Property-Rights Regimes and Bundle of Property Rights on 
POS 
 
Table 1: Four types of property-rights regimes with owners’ rights, duties, ownership and access 
 
Source: Adapted and slightly modified from Hanna et al.,(1996) 
To comprehend the property rights institution which is not institutionally-vacuum subsisted 
(Musole, 2009), particularly in resource domain governance, Buck (1998) argues, it is 
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relevant to distinguish the constituents within the property structure which comprise property 
rights regimes and a bundle of property rights. As for property regimes (about the rights of 
ownership and control allocation), quintessentially, there are four categories of regimes 
(Buck, 1998) but in reality, those regimes overlap each other instead (Satria, Matsuda, & 
Sano, 2006). Hanna et al., (1996) contend those regimes (Table 1) are critical institutions 
that organise the social-ecological interaction, more incisively, behavioural patterns and 
actions of stakeholders’ are formed in determining the resources’ outcome. 
Generally, relative property rights are economic claims or ability to the resources (either 
de jure or de facto authorised (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Within their oeuvre viz. property 
rights typology, there are five economic rights colligated accordingly with different positions 
(Table 2) that become essential heuristic for the study area analysis. Anyhow, both property 
regimes and property rights are cogently interdependent in moulding the POS’ outcomes as 
rights and duties assignation, which is like an agreement or ‘contract’ (Lee et al., 2013) 
between parties, determines human-ecological interaction respecting its natures of 
consumption and betterment whether it leads to the dilemmas and livability issues. 
 
Table 2: Bundle of property rights in resources that associated with different right-holders 
 
Source: Adapted from Schlager & Ostrom (1992) 
 
2.2 Property-Rights Structure, POS’ Social Dilemmas, and Quality of life  
In light of the property rights that affirmed by Satria, Matsuda & Sano (2006), it indeed 
determines the type of goods of which, the POS’ economic goods is paradigmatically 
transformed from ideal pure public good into a common pool resource (CPR). Such CPR-
based good is vulnerable to social dilemmas (commons dilemmas). Many scholars nem con 
asserted that, emergence of them are pertinent to the property rights failures i.e., the complex 
issues of security (Kim, 2004), definition (Coase, 1960), completeness (Baker, 2006; Nicita, 
Rizzolli, & Rossi, 2007), attenuation (robustness) (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972), and 
adaptiveness of assignment (Webster & Lai, 2003; Kim, 2004; Ostrom, 2008), of rights are 
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substantial as they define the incentive and (transaction) costs, willingness, ultimately the 
enforceability and enforcement which simultaneously shapes individuals’ behaviour and 
action (Musole, 2009) whether to behave opportunistically in POS market. 
 
 
Figure 2: Institutional property-rights structure as the determinant of quality of life 
Source: Adapted and slightly modified from Gerber et al.,(2009) 
 
In pursuit of clearer views on how POS’ quality is affected by institutional rights, various 
forms of social dilemmas are illustrated as follows; individuals overuse the space for illegal 
functions, e.g., waste disposal site (Garnett, 2012), low-cost condominium houses, squatting  
(Kassa, 2008), or vandalism and graffiti and littering (Garnett, 2012): parks and equipment 
are left desolate and broken (Foster, 2011), which, bring panhandling, (Garnett, 2012), and 
overcrowded (Webster, 2007) issues. Ergo, all these property-rights-triggered POS’ negative 
externalities drive the degraded POS deemed unsafe and insecure (criminal activity), dirty, 
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unattractive, congested and derelict space that consequently pose quality of life issues not 
only ecological and economic aspect but also social: physical and psychological health 
concern: heart-attack and social disintegration. Such relationship of institutional POS’ 
dilemma and quality of life is portrayed in Figure 2. 
 
 
3.0 Methodology 
 
3.1 The Study Area 
Capital city of Kota Kinabalu (KK) that surrounded by about 400 territorial POS (in 2013) 
within Country land including Native land (rural) and Town land (urban) with an approximate 
area and population of 351 km2 and 452,058 (year 2010) respectively which, falls within the 
West Coast Division of Sabah, Malaysia (Figure 3), was selected as the site study. Hitherto, 
only both headquarters of KK Lands and Surveys Department (LSD) and City Hall (CH) as 
the key informants (policy-makers) were focused as their verdicts made concerning practice 
in POS governance are constitutionally enforced in all other districts of the State.  
 
Figure 3: Map showing location of KK, Sabah, Malaysia 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis 
This paper employs case study strategy to exemplify Sabah’s practice on POS governance 
and its POS’ dilemmas that appertain to livability issues. As for the first objective, besides 
the secondary data collection: local government POS reports and presentations, archival 
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search: random POS’ title deed search, offer letters, legal document reviews, primary data 
were complementarily gathered via semi-structure interviews (face-to-face technique). As for 
the second objective, it was hitherto garnered via pilot test on two local government officers 
and land officers from different organisations, CH and LSD respectively. Semi-structured 
interviews (via phone calls and emails) were conducted. Furthermore, qualitative content 
(thematic/ coding) analysis was executed on the interviews data. 
 
 
4.0 Results and Discussions  
 
4.1 Diverse Property-Rights Structure Natures in POS Governance 
The result of the first objective shows that Sabah’s current practice in POS governance is 
delineated by title deed system, i.e., POS’ title deed is only granted on Country Lease (CL) 
and Town Lease (TL) while the Native Title, (NT) POS would be otherwise. All the 
respondents acknowledge such long-established practice, by citing the case of Sabindo 
Nusantara Sdn Bhd & Anor v Majlis Perbandaran Tawau & Ors [2011] 8 MLJ 653 that indeed 
title deed is only granted on the CL space but this provision does not impose on the NT’s 
POS due to some other reasons, e.g., transfer difficulty issue. Since the open space is meant 
for public use e.g., for recreational purpose (TCPO), then the ownership right of some types 
of POS are straightaway held as state property (like NT POS) but with attenuated rights 
(without exclusion and alienation) (Musole, 2009) except for the initial stage of titled POS like 
CL/ TL POS whereby the management duty, as well as ownership on CL and TL’s POS, are 
determined by title possession, more precisely, site transferability. If the title and site are yet 
to be transferred and held by, e.g., developer, then he should bear the initial POS 
development and management obligations. Veritably, such management duty is aligned by 
the title’s prerequisite stating that such duties shall be enforced up to the local authority’s 
satisfaction only then the compulsory title transfer to government is permitted. This (tite 
transfer and site handing over) is too substantiated by Sabindo’s case, based on the Modified 
Torrens System, albeit the individual retains the POS’ title, it does not entail ownership; 
instead, it is merely a trusteeship which is duty-bound to execute the transfer to a local 
authority (beneficiary) after fulfilling the management responsibility. Note that, even the title 
transfer has not been undertaken, so long as the management of developer has 
accomplished the local authority’s requirement, the site transfer is allowable, and if it were 
attempted, then it entails that, he (‘bare’ trustee) has officially relinquished the management 
right to the authority. Succinctly, consistent with Musole’s (2009) idea, indeed Sabah’s 
property-rights in POS governance cannot be institutionally vacuumed, in lieu, it is a practice-
based rights, i.e., the composite practice causes the property-rights structure diverseness in 
urban-rural POS governance (Table 3). 
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Table 3: A de jure overview of diverse property rights and regimes positions of Sabah’s 
POS governance. 
 
4.2 Institutional Rights Structure Arises Urban-Rural POS’ Dilemma and Livability 
Issues 
While, as for the second objective’s pre-test result, tersely, Sabah’s practice-based diverse 
property-rights that embrace contestations like rights mal-alignment of state property, rights 
attenuation, and incompleteness of rights, obligations and sanctions have prima facie 
triggered the urban-rural POS dilemma (due to less incentive and unenforceable issues). 
Such position is supported by the CH’s respondents that, roughly 40 percent of the total 400 
rivalry state-owned POS are not in favourable condition which, involve vandalised equipment 
and broken infrastructure, e.g., damaged fence, overgrown grass, spaces illegally become a 
house-extension, mosquitoes breeding ground, dumping ground, car-park, vegetation, and 
overcrowded issues especially in urban spaces as well as, illegal exclusion on spaces added 
by the LSD respondent. Under the state-managed POS, the management efficiency is 
primarily relying on the budget allocation, but sadly, a fiscal crisis is unavoidably confronted 
which has induced some under-provisioned POS. This indicates positive transaction cost 
(fiscal issue) (Webster & Lai, 2003) indeed becomes an impediment to local authority to 
enforce the management rights on the urban-rural POS (shirking issue: inefficient 
management and monitoring system). This is certainly a form of regulatory slippage (Foster, 
2011) in which, a transformation from legal state regime to de facto open access resource of 
POS is elusively taken place that can exacerbate the condition of spaces whereby, the users’ 
opportunism triggered off due to government unenforced rights. This is even concerted by 
the CH’s respondents that, urban POS, e.g., promenade or city park (minority) conditions are 
more superior than the community park in a residential area because guards are hired to do 
surveillance task: to monitor users’ behaviour on the urban space utilisation which is a part 
of a management right, while, less or no surveillance and maintenance are afforded for the 
residential commons (residents involved in overuse and moral hazard). Moreover, within the 
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Sabindo’s case, the POS had been used by the government for commercial shop lots and, 
even some spaces in KK also faced the similar fate added by the respondent. This means 
some spaces may opportunistically be overused for the private purpose by the government 
especially; the ownership is retained by them. Besides, under-specified rights and obligations 
within the informal ‘contract’, users, owners or government, they may ‘tempt’ to misbehave 
on the spaces (See, Williamson, 2002 on ex-post opportunism). 
Next, the privately-managed who do not possess the full-ownership (attenuated) on the 
POS, and are adhered to mandatorily transfer it to local authority after satisfying the 
obligations, may be  incentivised  to shirk, and overuse (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972) because 
they think the ‘bare’ rights does not confer any incentive (not even single penny from users; 
instead, all revenues go to the government), which at last to be handed over, so, what is the 
purpose for overhauling it? This is also agreed by the LSD’ respondents that, this practice is 
cumbersome and unrealistic as owners may find it difficult that, they do not only have to 
invest but also transfer them, in which, all the cream of the crop will fully be reaped by the 
government. So, they may not willingly or reluctant to enforce the management rights, and 
most importantly, it is not their property, like CH’s respondents argued that, some developers 
delayed the maintenance until the eleventh hour before the transfer (which caused the 
spaces were interim left unmanaged). Additionally, since users are not the owners, they are 
prone to overuse or act moral hazard like the antecedent state-managed POS situation as 
“one household only shovels the snow outside’s one’s door. No one cares about the frost 
above the roofs of others’ home” (Chinese byword). Noticeably, regardless of state or 
privately-managed POS, due to the property-rights failures, all has practically become an 
open-access resource in which, the tragedy of urban-rural POS is posed. All these 
institutionally-triggered opportunisms and self-interestedness on the POS that confirmed 
Hanna et al., (1996) and Schlager & Ostrom (1992) purviews that property institution indeed 
matters in social-ecological interaction particularly, about POS’ conditions, have plausibly 
posed quality of life issues. Salient connection between Sabah’s institutions, POS’ dilemmas 
and life quality, can, therefore, be analogous to the conceptual framework of Figure 4 above.  
 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
In a nutshell, this study has established the property-rights structure diverseness of Sabah’s 
present practice in urban-rural POS governance. A relationship between such institution of 
POS governance and quality of life is likewise unveiled, i.e., various institutional triggered 
social dilemma are posed. These findings have thereof bridged the lacuna of property-rights 
in new commons, POS, and livability issue. Several mechanisms are purported as the 
dilemma’s solutions such as an approach by the Nobel Laureate, Ostrom (1990) on common-
property-based eight principles of self-governing and organising the resource. The 
fundamental essence is a particular group is assigned rights to control and manage the POS 
(collective action), e.g., Home Owner Association, (HOA), but it may also require Leviathan 
state intervention (as a monitor) via contractual arrangement (Williamson, 2002; Chen & 
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Webster, 2006). The entire idea is to introduce an entrepreneurial club good concept instead 
of CPR good.  
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